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Concepts, Diagnosis and the History of Medicine:
Historicising Ian Hacking and Munchausen
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Summary. Concepts used by historians are as historical as the diagnoses or categories that are
studied. The example of Munchausen syndrome (deceptive presentation of illness in order to adopt
the ‘sick role’) is used to explore this. Like most psychiatric diagnoses, Munchausen syndrome is not
thought applicable across time by social historians of medicine. It is historically specific, drawing
upon twentieth-century anthropology and sociology to explain motivation through desire for the
‘sick role’. Ian Hacking’s concepts of ‘making up people’ and ‘looping effects’ are regularly utilised
outside of the context in which they are formed. However, this context is precisely the same anthro-
pological and sociological insight used to explain Munchausen syndrome. It remains correct to resist
the projection of Munchausen syndrome into the past. However, it seems inconsistent to use
Hacking’s concepts to describe identity formation before the twentieth century as they are given
meaning by an identical context.
Keywords: Retrospective diagnosis; Ian Hacking; Munchausen syndrome; anthropology;
sociology; Erving Goffman; psychopathy; illness behaviour
Introduction
Munchausen syndrome describes ‘the patient who chronically fabricates or induces illness
with the sole intention of assuming the patient role.’1 Another recent report defines it as:
‘characterized by the intentional production or feigning of physical or psychological signs
or symptoms, with a psychological need to assume the sick role.’2 The idea of a ‘sick’ or
‘patient’ role is central. In clinical circles it is more common today to refer to this condi-
tion as Fabricated or Induced Illness (FII); patients who might have been diagnosed with
Munchausen syndrome are now positioned at the extreme end of an FII spectrum.3
Despite this, ‘Munchausen syndrome’ is used here because it is the dominant name for
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1Helen Kinns, D. Housley and D. B. Freeman,
‘Munchausen Syndrome and Factitious Disorder: The
Role of the Laboratory in its Detection and Diagnosis’,
Annals of Clinical Biochemistry, 2013, 50, 194–203,
194.
2Raman Baweja, Rikita Baweja and Ahamad Hameed,
‘Munchausen’s Syndrome with Rare Hematological
Disorder, Systemic Mastocytosis: A Case Report’,
Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience,
2013, 25, E35–E38, E35.
3However, the current edition of the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) still uses the
Munchausen name.
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the condition in the middle of the twentieth century in the Anglophone states of the UK,
Eire, the USA, Canada and Australia.
Munchausen syndrome is named by London physician Richard Asher in the Lancet
1951. He describes people arriving at hospitals reporting acute abdominal pain, mysteri-
ous bleeding or fits and headaches. After much investigation, these ailments are discov-
ered to be consciously and deliberately deceptive. While the ‘sick role’ is a well-established
part of the motivation today, this is not the case in 1951. Asher is almost wholly unable to
account for the motivations behind these chronic deceptive presentations of illness.
Instead he writes of ‘the apparent senselessness of it’ and roots it in an unspecific ‘strange
twist of personality’ and ‘psychological kink’.4
Munchausen syndrome can be analysed as part of historically specific environments:
matched up with institutional practices, medical ideas or cultural currents. In this case,
the appearance of the syndrome is bound up with longstanding concerns around malin-
gering and public funds, which are amplified by anxieties over the freshly-inaugurated
National Health Service (NHS).5 However, this is not a parochial British story. The diagno-
sis travels far and wide (appropriately enough), being used in Eire in the early 1950s, the
USA and Canada by the mid-1950s, and Australia and India by the 1960s. Historians of
medicine have been documenting historical links between diagnoses, diseases and mate-
rial and intellectual contexts for some decades.6 Adrian Wilson’s 15-year-old survey of
these approaches remains one of the clearest statements of this historical method.7
Some of the most influential analytical tools used when analysing the history of diagno-
ses are those refined and developed by Ian Hacking from the early 1980s onwards.8
Hacking draws upon Michel Foucault to show how categories relating to selfhood and
identity are intimately connected to specific historical circumstances. He begins his career
as a philosopher of science, but migrates towards histories of psychiatric and medical clas-
sification, investigating multiple personality disorder, fugue states, and most recently,
autism. It is this cluster of work around diagnosis that interests me: how diagnosis inter-
venes upon a person’s sense of self, and how that self might change. These insights are
4Richard Alan John Asher, ‘Munchausen’s Syndrome’,
The Lancet, 1951, 257, 339–41, 339, 341.
5Rhodri Hayward, Transformations of the Psyche in
British Primary Care 1880–1970 (London: Bloomsbury,
2014), 35–41; Roger Cooter, ‘Malingering in
Modernity: Psychological Scripts and Adversarial
Encounters During the First World War’, in Roger
Cooter, Mark Harrison and Steve Sturdy, eds, War,
Medicine and Modernity (Stroud, Gloucestershire:
Sutton Publishing, 1999), 125–48; Alan Deacon, In
Search of the Scrounger: The Administration of
Unemployment Insurance in Britain, 1920–1931
(London: Bell, 1976).
6Ludwig Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific
Fact, trans. F. Bradley and T. J. Trenn, ed. T. J. Trenn
and R. K. Merton (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1979) [German edition 1935]; Georges
Canguilhem, Le normal et le pathologique (Paris,
1966) [The Normal and the Pathological, trans C. R.
Fawcett and R. S. Cohen] (New York: Dordrecht,
1991).
7Adrian Wilson, ‘On the History of Disease Concepts:
The Case of Pleurisy’, History of Science, 2000, 38,
271–319.
8Ian Hacking, ‘Making up People’ in T. Heller et al.
eds, Reconstructing Individualism (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1986): 222–36; Ian
Hacking, ‘The Looping Effects of Human Kinds’, in
D. Sperber, D. Premack and A. Premack, eds,
Causal Cognition. An Interdisciplinary Debate
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 351–83;
Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple
Personality and the Sciences of Memory (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
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regularly deployed by scholars in the history of medicine.9 The two most relevant parts of
Hacking’s conceptual armoury are ‘making up people’ and ‘looping effects’.
‘Making up people’ describes how people come to inhabit the identities that exist at
various points in history, or in different enviroments. Hacking opens with the Foucualdian
argument that ‘homosexuals’ did not exist before the nineteenth-century. The action of
‘sodomy’ is available before then, but the type of person, a ‘homosexual’ is not. Thus,
the argument goes, people can only ‘make themselves up’ according to the possibilities
for identity available in their particular context.10 ‘Looping effects’ is the name for what
happens when people are labelled as a kind of person, or with a certain illness. It de-
scribes the ways in which people might react (or not) to that label. They can change their
behaviour, they can be indifferent to the label, they can resist it, or they can adapt to fit
it, and even to exaggerate it. Thus, Hacking describes how the revival of the diagnosis of
multiple personality disorder (MPD) in North America in the 1980s leads, over time, to an
increase in the average number of alternate personalities (‘alters’) thought to exist within
individuals with MPD. The behaviour of those labelled ‘loops back’ onto the disorder
once it is diagnosed, and then changes (exaggerates) the disorder itself.11 Hacking calls
this ‘dynamic nominalism’, which describes the naming and the changes.
However, Munchausen patients characteristically fail to change in this way. Anthony
Fry and Tania Gergel’s recent article on factitious disorder (FD) shows this rather clearly:
‘FD patients exhibit an inability to realize and accept the discovery and evidence of their
condition. . . . This strongly suggests both a lack of insight and control over their condi-
tion’.12 A minority of patients actually do accept that they are faking, or simply stop their
deceptions.13 The fact that some small number of patients might, against expectation,
accept that they are simulating does not change that fact that Munchausen syndrome in
general is characterized by an absence of acceptance. Whilst such repetitive and intracta-
ble patients might conform quite precisely to the doctor’s view of a Munchausen case
(re-presenting over and over at hospitals), they are not ‘making themselves up’ as
Munchausen syndrome patients, they are attempting to inhabit a different diagnosis alto-
gether. Hacking allows for people to resist, to accept and to even be indifferent to diag-
nosis (in cases of autism, for example). All of these fall under the processes of ‘looping’.
However, what is happening in Munchausen syndrome is a subversion of diagnosis and
9See for example, Nancy Campbell and Laura Stark,
‘Making up “Vulnerable” People: Human Subjects
and the Subjective Experience of Medical Experiment’,
Social History of Medicine, 2015, 28, 825–48; Ivan
Crozier, ‘Making up Koro: Multiplicity, Psychiatry,
Culture and Penis-Shrinking Anxieties’, The History of
Medicine and the Allied Sciences, 2012, 67, 36–70;
‘Made Up People’ conference held at the University of
Warwick 25 October 2013 (where Ian Hacking gave
the keynote speech, and the argument in this article
was first presented): see <http://www2.warwick.ac.
uk/fac/arts/history/chm/events/conferences_work
shops/madeuppeople/> accessed 20 July 2015.
10Hacking, ‘Making up People’, 222.
11Hacking, ‘The Looping Effects of Human Kinds’, 368.
12Anthony Fry and Tania Gergel, ‘Paternalism and
Factitious Disorder: Medical Treatment in Illness
Deception’, Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice,
2016, 22, 565–74, 70. The term Factitious Disorder
is popularized by its inclusion in the third edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-III) (1980). These disorders are
defined as ‘characterized by physical or psychological
symptoms that are voluntarily initiated by the
patient’. S. E. Hyler and Robert L. Spitzer, ‘Hysteria
Split Asunder’, The American Journal of Psychiatry,
1978, 135, 1502, quoted in Richard A. A. Kanaan
and Simon C. Wessely, ‘The Origins of Factitious
Disorders’, History of the Human Sciences, 2010, 23,
68–85, 70.
13For an early example of this, see R. Yassa
‘Munchausen’s Syndrome: A Successfully Treated
Case’, Psychosomatics, 1978, 19, 242–3.
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of identity formation in itself. Whilst this is a reaction to diagnosis, and may well qualify
as ‘looping’, the focus here is that Munchausen syndrome subverts an important part of
this process of identity formation (the self-conscious negotiation), as well as being an-
other variety of it.
Why is it important that Munchausen syndrome is a subversion of diagnosis, rather
than resistance or acceptance or indifference? The answer is disarmingly simple, but it has
complicated implications. Munchausen syndrome becomes understood as disordered
identity, as a pathological adoption of a social role (the ‘sick role’). This means that it iden-
tifies precisely a disorder of part of those role-adopting processes that ‘looping’ and ‘mak-
ing up people’ seek to describe. The part of ‘making oneself up’ that describes self-
conscious identity formation is understood as the site of the pathology. This unites
Munchasuen syndrome and ‘making up people’, showing them to be equally situated and
historical. Munchausen syndrome emerges at a time when connections between medi-
cine, sociology and anthropology are growing. Awareness of a person’s ‘social setting’ is
high and sociological frames of reference help doctors to categorise and understand these
baffling patients. Initially this leads to a focus on their ‘anti-social behaviour’. As we ap-
proach the 1970s, ideas of sociological roles in medicine start to be applied more explicitly
to what is then called ‘abnormal illness behaviour’.
The implications of this are broad. It is not that Munchausen syndrome causes Hacking’s
insights to ‘fail’. The point emphasized here is that these connections with twentieth-
century sociology and anthropology are what make it illegitimate to project Munchausen
syndrome back into the past. Without those historically specific intellectual insights around
‘roles’, Munchausen syndrome cannot exist in any meaningful way. However, ‘making up
people’ and Munchausen syndrome are based upon exactly the same sociological insights.
It is not simply the case that Munchausen syndrome is bounded by a context that is analo-
gous to ‘making up people’: Munchausen syndrome is bounded and situated by precisely
the same context. Thus the example of Munchausen syndrome makes it most obvious that
Hacking’s concepts are also historical objects, and should not be thought useful without
limit and outside history (constraints readily accepted for psychiatric diagnoses such as
Munchausen syndrome). They are both part of a particular way of seeing the world that is
influential at a certain time. Hacking is explicitly influenced by sociologists and anthropolo-
gists—particularly Erving Goffman—and it is this cross-fertilisation that undergirds his anal-
ysis of the malleable, performed nature of identity. There are other, similar innovations in
psychology, philosophy and linguistics. Rather than seeking to diminish Hacking’s signal
contributions, this article aims to come to terms with the fact that the ideas, tools and con-
cepts used in history are as historical as the ideas and categories they are used to study.
Taking this further, it appears anachronistic to apply ‘looping effects’ to medieval saints or
ancient Greeks. Why should concepts forged through interactions between sociology, phi-
losophy and medicine in the twentieth century be apt to describe identity formation
throughout history and across cultures?
Sociology and Medicine—Broad Interactions
Munchausen syndrome is initially baffling because the doctors cannot see what motivates
these patients to undergo countless painful and dangerous operations. Asher argues that
‘Unlike the malingerer, who may gain a definite end, these patients often seem to gain
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nothing except the discomfiture of unnecessary investigations or operations.’14 This ab-
sence of gain slowly recedes as Munchausen becomes haltingly understood through an
awareness of the satisfactions of the social role of the patient, and thus through the in-
creasing connections between sociology and medicine. This is part of a much broader
shift. Erstwhile General Practitioner and influential sociologist of medicine David
Armstrong speaks of a twentieth-century ‘new gaze [which] identified disease in
the spaces between people, in the interstices of relationships, in the social body itself’. He
draws attention to the social focus of medicine in this period, adding that ‘[i]n psychiatry,
sociology has provided a rich and diverse contribution to the extension of the medical
gaze’.15 Social settings, social environments and social relationships all become influential
in medical practice in new and important ways. Armstrong traces this shift back to the
early twentieth century, but it is also clear that the Second World War has an accelerating
effect. As Colin Jones puts it: ‘the impact of Hitlerism deterred psychiatrists from locating
mental health problems solely within the individual and pushed them towards more socie-
tal explanations’.16
There are significant developments in academic sociology. American sociologist C.
Wright Mills’s classic White Collar (1951) claims that ‘[w]e need to characterize American
society of the mid-twentieth century in more psychological terms, for now the problems
that concern us most border on the psychiatric’.17 Sociology and psychiatry are mutually
reinforcing here. A key staging-post in medicine and sociology’s interaction is sociologist
Talcott Parsons’ concept of the sick role, with its attendant benefits and costs. Parsons’
analysis is published in 1951—incidentally the same year as Asher’s article on
Munchausen. As historian John C. Burnham points out, the ‘sick role’ is not wholly
Parsons’ idea—he builds upon (but does not acknowledge) the work of a Harvard gradu-
ate student, David M. Schneider. Schneider studies behaviour around illnesses in army
units during the 1940s, showing the roots of Munchausen syndrome in anthropology and
malingering.18 It is also clear that, as Burnham affirms, the ‘primordial source for the idea
of the sick role was cultural anthropology’.19 Thus twentieth-century sociology and an-
thropology—from Mills and Parsons, and back through Herbert Blumer, Clifford Geertz,
Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson and others—is centrally implicated in Munchausen
syndrome.
Parsons identifies four aspects to the ‘sick role’, and casts them in terms of exemptions
on the one hand, and obligations on the other. Anyone who has the sick role is exempt
from normal social obligations, exempt from responsibility for the sickness, obliged to try
and get out of the sick state as quickly as possible, and required to seek appropriate help
to do so. Munchausen syndrome patients come to be seen as desiring the exemptions
14Asher, ‘Munchausen’s Syndrome’, 339.
15David Armstrong, Political Anatomy of the Body
Medical Knowledge in Britain in the Twentieth
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983), 114.
16Colin Jones, ‘Raising the Anti: Jan Foudraine, Ronald
Laing and Anti-Psychiatry’, in Colin Jones and Roy
Porter, eds, Reassessing Foucault: Power, Medicine
and the Body (London: Routledge, 1998), 286.
17C. Wright Mills, White Collar: The American Middle
Classes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), xx.
18David M. Schneider, ‘The Social Dynamics of Physical
Disability in Army Basic Training’, Psychiatry:
Interpersonal and Biological Processes, 1947, 10,
323–33.
19John Chynoweth Burnham, ‘Why Sociologists
Abandoned the Sick Role Concept’, History of the
Human Sciences, 2013, 27, 70–87, 73.
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but not fulfilling the obligations. However, we must also be aware of Armstrong’s point
that ‘within Parsons’ analytic framework there was little space for independent action by
the patient’. The Parsonian vision of the patient, according to Armstrong, is that of ‘doc-
ile figures with no responsibility for their predicament and minimal involvement in their
own care’.20 This is perhaps why the ‘patient role’ does not initially seem to fit
Munchausen, as it involves rather more agency on the part of the supposed patient.
Another important conduit for crossovers between sociology, anthropology and medi-
cine is Erving Goffman’s work. His influential works include The Presentation of Self
in Everyday Life (1957), Asylums (1961) and Stigma (1963).21 As we shall see, Goffman’s
influence on Hacking emerges in a significant way in the 1980s, in the same way as it
becomes useful to understandings of Munchasuen patients in the 1970s.
However, what is most interesting here is how Goffman’s earliest work analyses ‘confi-
dence tricksters’, or ‘con-artists’. Historian of psychology Michael Pettit astutely observes
that this feeds into Goffman’s view of ‘social intercourse as an inherently deceptive dra-
matic performance’.22 At the centre of Goffman’s sociology is a dissimulating human na-
ture. Tightly intertwined here are post-war sociology, medicine and a concept of human
nature that corresponds to Munchausen syndrome remarkably well. A recent article review-
ing factitious disorders in the Lancet echoes this sentiment, showing this perspective—the
normalisation of deception—to be influential still. This article claims that ‘although factitious
disorders and malingering are both clinically significant, deception is a pervasive, normal,
and ubiquitous social behaviour of human nature.’23
Munchausen syndrome travels from the UK to North America through correspondence
in medical journals, an article in Time magazine in 1951, as well as an editorial in the
Canadian Medical Association Journal in the late 1950s. In a similar way, sociology
practised and popularised in North America by Talcott Parsons, C. Wright Mills and
Erving Goffman also travels, and influences academics and physicians in Britain. This
does not happen only through vague Anglophone academic osmosis. Goffman’s doctoral
fieldwork in anthropology is carried out in the mid-1950s on the Shetland Islands, off the
coast of Scotland, under the auspices of the University of Edinburgh. In addition, pioneer-
ing medical sociologist David Mechanic completes a year’s fellowship in the Social
Psychiatry research unit at the influential Institute of Psychiatry and Maudsley Hospital in
South London in 1965–66.
In 1960, Mechanic and Edmund Volkart put forward the concept of ‘illness behaviour’,
by which they mean ‘the ways in which given symptoms may be differentially perceived,
20David Armstrong, ‘Actors, Patients and Agency: A
Recent History’, Sociology of Health and Illness,
2014, 36, 163–74, 163.
21Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation
of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (New York:
Doubleday, 1961); Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the
Management of a Spoiled Identity (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1963); Erving Goffman, The Presentation of
Self in Everyday Life (New York: Anchor, 1959).
22Michael Pettit, ‘The Con Man as Model Organism:
The Methodological Roots of Erving Goffman’s
Dramaturgical Self’, History of the Human Sciences,
2011, 24, 138–54, 149.
23Christopher Bass and Peter Halligan, ‘Factitious
Disorders and Malingering: Challenges for Clinical
Assessment and Management’, The Lancet, 2014,
383, 1422–32, 1422.
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evaluated, and acted (or not acted) upon by different kinds of persons’.24 Here again,
the behavioural sciences and their interaction with medicine is key. It is not just illness,
but the subjective experience of illness, and the attitudes of the people so diagnosed that
is the focus here. This sociological and anthropological influence is explicitly built upon by
Issy Pilowsky in 1969, who adapts these insights to analyse what he calls ‘abnormal illness
behaviour’—which includes Munchausen syndrome.25 Pilowsky brings together Parsons,
Mechanic and psychiatry (specifically discussions of hysteria), joining up the dots between
sociological roles, ideas of behaviour and psychopathology (or at the very least, psycho-
logical abnormality).
Eminent psychiatrist Martin Roth delivers an entertaining Presidential Address to the
Medical Society of the University of Durham in 1962 on the topic of the ‘Desire to be Ill’.
In it, he argues that ‘explanations for the deliberate simulation of illness or disability . . .
would require much more knowledge than we possess’. However, he does see a number
of professionals being able to contribute: ‘the field is of sufficient interest to be worthy of
research by the psychiatrist, the physician and the social scientist’.26 This is an early exam-
ple of a non-clinical worker (and social scientist in particular) being put forward to explain
the baffling motivations, showing the potential for overlap between social science and
medicine.
David Vail, a doctor at the Department of Public Welfare in Minnesota, USA, de-
scribes two cases in his 1962 article ‘Munchausen returns’. He notes that ‘A previously
unexplored dimension in these cases is the sociological’ and that ‘just as there are well-
established modes, according to which class distinction and behavior operate among
hospital staffs, there are definite rules for patients also.’ Vail also mentions that one of
these men ‘has adapted himself to hospitals’.27 It must be said that Vail’s use of the
term ‘sociological’ here seems a little idiosyncratic, and he does not talk of ‘roles’, but
does use the sociological staples of culture, adaptation and adjustment. It is clear that
the analytical frame is zooming out, taking in the environment and the psychopathol-
ogy of these patients. More generally, the idea of role play seems to gather pace during
the 1960s, as a Munchausen report from Chandigarh, India draws upon (and foot-
notes) Asher to argue that one motive is ‘[a] pathological satisfaction derived from play-
ing the role of a patient’.28
Patient presentations and roles are also understood in a commonsense idiom. In 1963,
Robert Kemp writes in the Lancet of the ‘familiar face syndrome’ or the ‘thick-file case’,
and cautions that one ‘should bear in mind what is often pointed out by the novelist,
that ill health can be a gainful (even if disastrous) policy in itself’.29 In 1964, one Surrey
doctor writes to the British Medical Journal describing ‘those people whose main role in
24David Mechanic and Edmund H. Volkart, ‘Illness
Behavior and Medical Diagnoses’, Journal of Health
and Human Behavior, 1960, 1, 86–94, 87.
25See Issy Pilowsky, ‘Abnormal Illness Behavior’,
British Journal of Medical Psychology, 1969, 42,
347–51. For a brief lineage, tracing sociological in-
fluences on hysteria from Parsons, to Mechanic to
Pilowsky, see C. D. Marsden, ‘Hysteria—A
Neurologist’s View’, Psychological Medicine, 1986,
16, 277–88, 285.
26Martin Roth, ‘The Desire to be Ill’ University of
Durham Medical Gazette, 1962, 57, 2–14, 10.
27David J. Vail, ‘Munchausen Returns. A Case Report’,
Psychiatric Quarterly, 1962, 36, 317–24, 318, 321.
28A. K. Sehgal and J. C. Mangla, ‘Munchausen
Syndrome (a Case Report)’, Journal of the
Association of Physicians of India, 1964, 12, 309–13,
310.
29Robert Kemp, ‘The Familiar Face’, The Lancet, 1963,
281, 1225.
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life has in fact become that of a patient. Some of these people seem to have adopted
this role almost as a conscious choice in distinction to following some gainful occupation
or profession.’30 Both examples acknowledge the positives involved in patienthood. ‘Sick
roles’ become integral to Munchausen patients through an appropriation of sociological
knowledge into psychology and psychiatry. Sometimes this is explicitly borrowed, as in
the cases of Vail and Pilowsky, and sometimes it is not. As we have seen above, it is now
common to invoke these role aspirations as central.
Psychopathy and Anti-social Behaviour
Cross-fertilisation with sociology, anthropology and social science is not the only way that
Munchausen syndrome and deceptive health behaviours are understood. When
Munchausen syndrome first emerges, it is chiefly labelled as a variant of psychopathy. Eric
Frankel from Wanstead Hosptial argues in 1951 that ‘[t]hese patients are invariably severe
psychopaths, and their psychopathic personality requires treatment’.31 Two doctors in
Hammersmith in 1958 are relieved that ‘these patients have at last been recognized as a spe-
cial type of psychopathic personality’.32 Today the term ‘psychopath’ conjures up the carica-
tured, fictional extremes of Hannibal Lecter and Patrick Bateman—men who are charismatic,
violent, ruthless and successful. In contrast, during the 1950s and 1960s psychopathy covers
a much wider range of supposed conditions, linked by their apparent antisociality, including
homosexuality, delinquency, alcoholism and chronic unemployment.33
The diagnosis is rather nebulous. As Maxwell Jones states in expert evidence to the
Percy Commission (the recommendations of which form the basis for the Mental Health
Act 1959): ‘It is probably impossible to find a satisfactory definition for psychopathic states
at the present state of our knowledge.’34 The British Medical Association’s memorandum
to the same Commission says that they ‘considered the question of formulating a defini-
tion of “psychopathic offender” but reached the conclusion that it would be unwise to at-
tempt this as such a definition might prove difficult to operate in a court of law’.35 More
succinctly, Barbara Wooton sums up the available knowledge in 1959, concluding that
‘psychopaths are extremely selfish persons and no one knows what makes them so’.36
Despite these definitional difficulties, psychopathy is inextricably bound up with ideas
of the ‘social setting’. Martyn Pickersgill argues that during the 1960s in Britain ‘[t]here
was agreement at least that psychopathy was socially, as well as clinically, problematic’.37
In fact, anti-sociality is right at the core of descriptions of psychopathy in this period.
30T. L. Dunn, ‘Professional Patients’, British Medical
Journal, 1964, 5413, 879.
31Eric Frankel, ‘Munchausen’s Syndrome’, The Lancet,
1951, 257, 911.
32E. Clarke and S. C. Melnick, ‘Munchausen Syndrome
or the Problem of Hospital Hoboes’, American
Journal of Medicine, 1958, 6–12, 6.
33Henry Werlinder, Psychopathy: A History of the
Concepts: Analysis of the Origin and Development of
a Family of Concepts in Psychopathology (Stockhom:
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1978).
34Maxwell Jones ‘Memorandum of Evidence’, Royal
Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness
and Mental Deficiency, Minutes of Evidence,
Thirtieth Day (Tuesday 26 July 1955) (London:
HMSO, 1955), 1230 (henceforth Royal Commission,
Evidence).
35British Medical Association, ‘Memorandum of
Evidence’, Royal Commission, Evidence, Twenty-
Sixth Day (Wednesday 27 April 1955) (London:
HMSO, 1955), 1055.
36Barbara Wootton, Social Science and Social
Pathology (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1959),
249.
37Martyn Pickersgill, ‘The Endurance of Uncertainty:
Antisociality and Ontological Anarchy in British
Psychiatry, 1950–2010’, Science in Context, 2014,
27, 143–75, 153.
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Jones’s memorandum to the Commissioners describes a ‘concept of social defectiveness
as . . . more realistic than any attempt at a diagnostic classification’.38 The British Medical
Association opens its section on psychopathic states by talking of ‘mental abnormality’
which renders people ‘delinquent or otherwise anti-social’. This is repeated by the Royal
Medico-Psychological Association—the forerunner of the Royal College of Psychiatrists.39
The connections between psychopathy (and thus Munchausen syndrome) and social sci-
ence go deeper. When describing a treatment programme specifically for psychopaths
run at Belmont hospital, Jones reports using ‘many concepts borrowed from the social sci-
ence field’. Moreover, when questioned, he reveals the extent of ‘social science’ involve-
ment: ‘We have largely dispensed with orthodox nursing help . . . and orthodox
psychiatric treatment . . . [A]part from a nucleus of trained nursing staff, we now use so-
cial science personnel. We have eleven people most of whom have a social science train-
ing rather than a training in the field of medicine’.40 The ‘social’ over the ‘medical’ is
explicit here.
A 1959 editorial in the magazine Medical World puts this in critical terms: ‘the criteria
of psychopathy are social not medical. Doctors should not be asked to act as the social
conscience of society’. Psychopathy is seen—explicitly by some—to be an extension of
the social role of medicine: society’s social conscience.41 Finally, an obscure article in a so-
ciological journal that predates Asher’s Munchausen article and Parsons’ Social System
gives an insight into attempts to understand psychopathy wholly in terms of social roles.
‘A Sociological Theory of Psychopathy’ (1948) by Harrison G. Gough builds on the an-
thropology of George Herbert Mead and others to argue that ‘the psychopathic person-
ality is pathologically deficient in role-playing abilities’.42 This shows the links between an
appreciation of the social setting and newly prominent forms of mental pathology. These
are used to shed light upon those labelled as having Munchausen syndrome. This idea of
psychopathy being ‘social’ in this specific historical period can be usefully contrasted with
one of the ideas ‘gaining credence today’ according to Pickersgill, that ‘psychopathy is a
disorder of empathy and hence related to the amygdala.’43 Psychopathy isn’t necessarily
social, but it most certainly is at this historical juncture, and this is key to understandings
of Munchausen syndrome in the 1950s.
Munchausen syndrome is not solely understood through a socially-focused concept of
psychopathy, or only through anthropological and sociological concepts of roles.
However, these are influential ways of doing so from the 1950s onwards. There are a
number of other concepts such as ‘secondary gain’ and ‘imposture’, which are popular
38Jones, ‘Memorandum of Evidence’, 1230–1231.
39British Medical Association, ‘Memorandum of
Evidence’, 1054; Royal Medico-Psychological
Association ‘Memorandum of Evidence’, Royal
Commission, Evidence, Eighth Day (Tuesday 12
October 1954 & Wednesday 27 October 1954)
(London: HMSO, 1955), 287.
40Jones, ’Memorandum of Evidence’, 1229, 1236.
41[Anonymous], ‘Mental Health’, Medical World,
February 1959, 137–9, 138.
42Harrison G. Gough, ‘A Sociological Theory of
Psychopathy’, American Journal of Sociology 1948,
53, 362–3.
43Pickersgill ‘Endurance of Uncertainty’, 163.
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within psychoanalysis, as well as understanding it in relation to models of anorexia ner-
vosa and addiction.44 However, it is striking is that even before Munchausen syndrome is
understood in an explicitly sociological (role-centred) manner, it is still understood as an
exceptionally social—in fact ‘anti-social’—phenomenon.
Hacking and Goffman—Looping and Sociology
Having shown the diverse links between Munchausen, psychopathy, sociology and the
social setting, it remains for me to link up the other half of the argument—the concepts
of Ian Hacking. The aim is to show that both Munchausen syndrome and ‘making up
people’ are built on the same sociological/anthropological foundations, part of the same
historically situated problem. Thus if Munchausen syndrome is not to be projected back-
wards and used to understand behaviours before the 1950s, it is inconsistent to perform
the same projections of ‘making up people’ before the emergence of the sociology and
anthropology upon which (as we shall see) it is based. This is not to claim that Hacking’s
concepts fail, but instead that they are historical, in precisely the same way as
Munchausen syndrome.
First, we must just glance at two of the most recent and clear statements on looping.
In Hacking’s review of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders in 2013 he notes that diagnosis has
[S]ubtle effects on how patients think of themselves, how they feel and how they
behave. Especially since nowadays . . . patients tend to look it up online. There they
obtain a sort of stereotype of how they ought to be feeling and behaving.45
In an interview after winning the Holberg Prize he states that ‘I do think there is a wide-
spread phenomenon I called “looping”. Classifying people has an effect on how they con-
ceive of themselves, they internalize how they are classified’. The example cited is that of
MPD, where patients ‘adapted their behaviour to fit the diagnosis’ but also exaggerated
it. As noted, Hacking demonstrates the inflation in the average number of personalities
that patients have, showing how ‘the behaviour of the patients looped back on the de-
scription of the disorder’.46 In a general sense, he argues that ‘[c]lassifying changes peo-
ple, but the changed people cause classifications themselves to be redrawn’.47
44For an historical overview of the concept of ‘second-
ary gain’, see J. J. Van Egmond, ‘The Multiple
Meanings of Secondary Gain’, American Journal of
Psychoanalysis, 2003, 63, 137–47. For ‘imposture’,
see Ben Bursten, ‘On Munchausen’s Syndrome’,
Archives of General Psychiatry, 1965, 13, 264, which
draws upon H. Deutsch, ‘The Imposter: Contribution
to Ego Psychology of a Type of Psychopath’,
Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 1955, 24, 483–505. On
anexoria nervosa, see J. R. Hawkings, et al.,
‘Deliberate Disability’, British Medical Journal, 1956,
4963, 361–7; Alan Dickson Wright, ‘How Patients
have Deceived Me’, Transactions of the Hunterian
Society, 1955–56, 14, 13–30; Roth, ‘Desire to be Ill’,
1–18. For addiction, see J. C. Barker, ‘The Syndrome
of Hospital Addiction (Munchausen Syndrome): A
Report on the Investigation of Seven Cases’, British
Journal of Psychiatry, 1962, 108, 167–82.
45Ian Hacking, ‘Lost in the Forest’ London Review of
Books, 2013, 35, 7–8. Online at< http://www.lrb.co.
uk/v28/n16/ian-hacking/making-up-people>, accessed
20 July 2015.
46O. J. Madsen, J. Servan and S. A. Øyen, ‘“I am a phi-
losopher of the particular case”: An Interview with
the 2009 Holberg Prizewinner Ian Hacking’, History
of the Human Sciences, 2006, 26, 32–51, 37.
47Ian Hacking, ‘Between Michel Foucault and Erving
Goffman: Between Discourse in the Abstract and
Face-to-face Interaction’, Economy and Society
2004, 33, 277–302, 279.
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These passages all involve identification with a diagnosis, and an internalisation of it. To
the extent the diagnosis changes, it becomes more extreme—the opposite of resistance.
Hacking’s essay ‘The Looping Effects of Human Kinds’ also mentions a stereotypical re-
sponse to being labelled as a ‘bad kind’. Here looping involves a move away from the
negative connotations, with Hacking talking about how people might ‘do things a little
differently from now on. Not just to escape opprobrium . . . but because I do not want to
be that kind of person’.48 This is resistance in a way, but based around an awareness
that a category is ‘bad’ and acceptance that it is not good to be classed as one of those.
There is still an identification with the value system, an internalisation of the prohibition.
Finally, Hacking mentions what he calls ‘inaccessible kinds’—such as infants or children
diagnosed with autism—who ‘cannot take in how they are classified’. In these cases the
looping effect ‘works on the kind and its auxiliaries—family and remedial workers’.49
People might resist, they might accept, they might exaggerate or they might be indiffer-
ent. In all cases, looping still occurs. Hacking describes many varieties of ways to react, but
Munchausen syndrome is different, as it explicitly pathologises part of those processes: the
attempted assumption of one identity (acute physical sickness) and self-conscious resistance
of another (the dissimulating, psychopathic Munchausen patient). Looping is built upon the
same (historical) insights as those that structure Munchausen syndrome, it is in fact a patho-
logical manifestation of them. Thus Hacking’s concepts and Munchausen syndrome can be
thought of as conceptually bolted together, as the normal/pathological sides of the same an-
thropological coin. However, before we get to the significance of this subversion, we should
assess Hacking’s explicit links to earlier sociology, especially that of Goffman and Parsons.
Parsons’ functionalist sociology of 1951 is worlds away from the sophisticated dynamic
nominalism of Hacking from the early 1980s onwards, but the links between sociology and
anthropology and Hacking’s work are strong. As the ‘sick role’ becomes increasingly central
to Munchausen syndrome in the 1970s and 1980s, that same sociological awareness of the
flexibility and performativity of human social interaction informs ideas of ‘making up people’
and ‘looping effects’. It is right at this time (the early 1980s) that Hacking begins a transition
from his work in the history of science to working on subjectivity. The paper ‘Making up
People’ is given in 1983, but the previous year he publishes a paper on ‘Biopower and the
Avalanche of Printed Numbers’.50 This paper might tentatively be seen as marking a transi-
tion between Hacking’s histories of science and his histories of subjectivity. His book The
Emergence of Probability (1975) is firmly in the history of science mould, and deals with sta-
tistical reasoning.51 He then extends his statistical interests to those labelling humans, talking
about suicide statistics. Here he clearly signals the influence of Michel Foucault—perhaps
the most famous twentieth-century scholar of subjectivity—by using the word ‘biopower’.
In fact he began that article by mentioning Foucault’s 1966 classic Les Mots et Les Choses,
rendered into English as The Order of Things.
However, Foucault is not the influence at issue here, but various sociologists and
anthropologists, chief amongst them Erving Goffman. Hacking not only acknowledges
48Hacking, ‘Looping Effects’, 368.
49Ibid., 374, 379.
50Ian Hacking, ‘Biopower and the Avalanche of Printed
Numbers’, Humanities in Society, 1982, 5, 279–95.
51Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: A
Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability,
Induction and Statistical Inference (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1975).
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but celebrates his debt to Goffman. A review of two of Hacking’s books in 2001 notes
that:
Goffman developed an ecological orientation and deployed a conceptual vocabulary
(involving ‘looping effects’) that resembles Hacking’s substantive account of tran-
sient mental illnesses. Sociologists who read Hacking may appreciate his substantive
research but wonder if he is not reinventing the wheel. Or, rather, they may wonder
if he is not reinventing the loop.52
Lynch admits that if taken too literally, this ‘would be unfair’ but that ‘it is worth exploring
the parallels’.53 A few years later, Hacking responds generously: ‘How right he was! I have
a slightly different view of the parallels than he does; I think the parallels are like straight
lines that never meet.’54 Thus ‘looping’ is tightly intertwined with a particular period in
sociology.
Munchausen Syndrome and Looping: Anthropology and ‘Malleable
Humanity’
Patients with Munchausen syndrome are increasingly understood through the social set-
ting, psychopathy and social roles. We have also seen how specific, influential sociologists
are central to Hacking’s work. It has also been shown how Munchausen syndrome patients
complicate ideas of looping because the patients’ motivations are understood as a patho-
logical form of exactly the same sociological processes that undergird Hacking’s concepts.
Both are based on a universal vision of human nature that is plastic, malleable and
inscribable—this idea emerges directly from early twentieth-century anthropology.
It is important to note how Hacking explicitly disavows a certain kind of universalism:
Philosophy is heroic (in my version of events) when it tries to paint a picture of the
whole of human nature—and of the place of human beings in nature. . . . I am the
very opposite of heroic, not cowardly but proudly particularist. I think there is no
fixed whole of human nature to discuss.55
This point about particularism, along with his statement that there is ‘no reason to sup-
pose that we shall ever tell two identical stories of two different instances of making up
people’ is well taken.56 However, Hacking does not say anywhere—so far as I am
aware—that people will not loop, even if that looping is of a non-self-conscious (inacces-
sible) type. Indeed, it might even be said that the subversion of looping by attempting to
assume the sick role is a kind of looping after all, because the diagnosis of Munchausen
syndrome affects those around the patient, whose behaviour then changes. In this way,
there is no fixed human nature for Hacking precisely because everybody loops, in differ-
ent contexts, at different times, with different interactions and varied stimuli. Or to put it
another way: nobody is fixed because everybody loops.
52Michael Lynch, ‘The Contingencies of Social
Construction’, Economy and Society, 2001, 30, 240–
54, 247.
53Lynch, ‘Contingencies of Social Construction’, 247.
54Hacking, ‘Between Foucault and Goffman’, 280.
55Ibid., 281.
56Hacking, ‘Lost in the Forest’.
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Hacking’s concepts cover an enormous variety of practices, but in the end, everybody
loops, anywhere, at any time. This in itself should ring alarm bells for historians, as it
seems to be a trans-historical or extra-historical process. The very variety spawned by
these concepts relies upon a universal plasticity, which props up a universally interacting,
looping selfhood. This universally plastic selfhood (or perhaps ‘pre-self’) has its source in
a specific kind of twentieth-century anthropology. Margaret Mead’s classic Coming of
Age in Samoa (1928) celebrates the manifold differences in the process of adolescence
(‘coming of age’) between North America and Samoa. The book is also explicitly ad-
dressed at the problem of juvenile delinquency in the United States, and how this might
be solved—one of the later chapters is entitled ‘Our Educational Problems in Light of
Samoan Contrasts’.57
The relevance of Mead’s work in Samoa to the problem of juvenile delinquency in the
USA rests upon this sense of a universal plasticity to human nature. Mead’s mentor,
Franz Boas, writes an appreciative foreword in which he claims ‘much of what we ascribe
to human nature is no more than a reaction to the restraints put upon us by our civiliza-
tion’.58 Mead herself writes that ‘neither race nor common humanity can be held respon-
sible for many of the forms which even such basic emotions as love and fear and anger
take under different social conditions’. But straight from this disavowal of common hu-
manity, she deploys something universal, writing of ‘babies who have as yet no civiliza-
tion to shape their malleable humanity’.59
Thus, Mead’s argument runs, if some of the features of Samoan society that suppos-
edly render ‘coming of age’ so serene in the Pacific could be transferred to the USA, it
might ameliorate the delinquency problem. Precisely because this anthropology must
parse so much difference (and indeed it implicitly attacks the idea that problems like ‘ju-
venile delinquency’ are inevitable or universal), it relies upon this ‘malleable humanity’:
an overarching sameness, a human nature that is fundamentally inscribable, fundamen-
tally moulded by circumstance. Australian anthropologist Derek Freeman has spent a
great deal of time and energy criticising Mead’s fieldwork in Samoa, and what he calls
‘Boasian culturalism’ in general. This latter he characterises as the ‘extreme’ and ‘prepos-
terous’ conclusion that ‘the phenomena of adolescence are due not to physiology, but to
“the social environment”’. Preposterous or not, these ideas have been very influential in
certain circles. Freeman admits as much, quoting an historian of American anthropology
who in 1973 characterised such ‘culturalism’ as ‘fundamental to all of American social
science’.60
Thus sociology, social science, psychopathy and Munchausen syndrome all draw upon
the same set of insights and conceptual frameworks as Ian Hacking, Erving Goffman and
even Michel Foucualt. Rhodri Hayward notes that Foucault’s arguments (made in the
1960s) around moral treatment in nineteenth-century asylums are built upon the idea
57Mararet Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa: A Study of
Adolescence and Sex in Primitive Societies
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1943 [1928]), 157–86.
58Franz Boas in Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa, 6.
59Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa, 11.
60Derek Freeman, ‘Margaret Mead’s Coming of Age in
Samoa and Boasian Culturalism’, Politics and the Life
Sciences, 2000, 19, 101–3, 101.
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that the ‘patient’s psyche was a tabula rasa inscribed with the interests of lay asylum
keepers, medical professionals, magistrates and their desperate families’.61 This ‘mallea-
ble humanity’ in Mead’s apt phrase is precisely the root of Hacking’s denial of a universal
human nature. Ironically enough, this anti-universalism is based upon an idea of a univer-
sal plasticity.
Munchausen syndrome and ‘making up people’ and ‘looping effects’ are thus shown
up as parts of the same intellectual context. Patients with Munchausen syndrome subvert
part of what Hacking describes (in all its detail and variation). It is all built upon historically
situated anthropological frames of reference.
It might be asked whether Munchausen syndrome, alone amongst diagnoses, can
make obvious the situated nature of Hacking’s concepts. In one sense that answer must
be ‘no’ because all diseases have specificity, and all diagnoses are situated and historical,
from schizophrenia to syphilis, from pleurisy to post-traumatic stress disorder.62 What is
important here is that Munchausen syndrome brings the situated nature of Hacking’s
concepts into sharp relief because it is bounded and historically specific in the same way
as Hacking’s concepts are.
Similarly, arguing that Munchausen syndrome is diagnosed through a process of ‘mak-
ing up people’ should not be taken to imply that this syndrome is the only (or even the
dominant) identity for these patients. Identity is malleable and context-specific in this
reading: Munchausen syndrome forms around the self that interacts, deceives and negoti-
ates in the emergency department. Asher notes ‘an intense desire to deceive everybody
as much as possible. . . . They lie for the sake of lying . . . merely from a love of false-
hood.’63 This suggests that the deception is not confined to hospital presentations that
become labelled as Munchausen syndrome.
Built around notions of identity, through a flexible and specifically anthropological un-
derstanding of social roles, Munchausen syndrome brings the specificity of Hacking’s
methodological insights into sharper focus than perhaps any other diagnosis or illness
category. Munchausen syndrome shows most clearly that the historical baggage around
a disease category is of the same quality as the baggage around Hacking’s concepts be-
cause it is the same baggage. Instead of being able to show that a disease category’s his-
torical specificity is analogous to that of Hacking’s concept, Munchausen syndrome
enables me to show that it is precisely the same specificity as that which is attached to
Hacking’s concepts. Armed with this insight, we can analyse the historical nature of ana-
lytical concepts. John Savage and others have termed this the ‘social life of methods’,
where methods are ‘a fascinating object of inquiry . . . the very stuff of social life.64
Diagnoses and the ways in which we analyse them are historically contingent. Hacking’s
concepts and Munchausen syndrome are based on the same anthropological and
61Rhodri Hayward, ‘Medicine and the Mind’, in Mark
Jackson, ed., The Oxford Handbook of the History of
Medicine (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013),
524–42, 529.
62For schizophrenia see Jonathan Metzel, The Protest
Psychosis: How Schizophrenia became a Black
Disease (Boston, MA: Beacon, 2009); for syphilis see
Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact;
for pleurisy see Wilson, ‘On the History of Disease
Concepts’; for post-traumatic stress disorder, see
Young, Harmony of Illusions.
63Asher, ‘Munchausen’s Syndrome’, 339.
64John Savage, ‘The “Social Life of Methods”: A
Critical Introduction’, Theory, Culture and Society,
2013, 30, 3–21, 5.
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sociological insights, standing upon the same intellectual ground. This particular way of
seeing the world brings out the self-conscious, performative, aspects of human
interaction.
Twentieth-century Identity
It is a characteristically twentieth-century position to view human nature as self-
conscious acting. This involves rejecting the idea of a truth or essence, coming to believe
instead that the truth is malleable, and identity is dynamic (and therefore might loop, or
become disordered). This radical scepticism around the possibility of essences can be
seen in Jacques Derrida’s theory that words have no essential meaning; meanings are
conveyed by the relations between words.65 Stuart Hall memorably appropriates this in-
sight when talking about concepts of race:
race works like a language . . . things gain their meaning, not because of what they
contain in their essence, but in the shifting relations of difference. . . . Their mean-
ing, because it is relational, and not essential, can never be finally fixed, but is sub-
ject to the constant process of redefinition and appropriation.66
This rejection of essences, and its relation to Munchausen syndrome and Ian Hacking, can
be seen perfectly, if unexpectedly, in a Lancet lead article from 1962. This article, in a
prominent medical journal, draws out the startling implications of Jean-Paul Satre’s exis-
tential philosophy for malingering patients. Entitled ‘Compensation for Cupidity?’ the arti-
cle approaches the question of financial compensation for psychological injuries. As
noted, Munchausen syndrome has roots in concerns about malingering and fraudulent
claim-staking. The article claims that ‘one of the causes of such traumatic neurosis is the
expectation of compensation, and that the law is paradoxically compelling one party to
compensate another for a consequence of his act which the law itself has created’.67
Therefore, the provision of compensation encourages and indeed produces the psycho-
logical injury. Rather than decrying this as greed or fraud, the author notes instead that
this brings us to ‘the root of human responsibility’ and draws upon analysis of Jean Paul
Sartre: ‘The essence of man . . . lies rather in the radical liberty of man’s existence by which
he chooses himself and so makes himself what he is. . . . A man is his life, says Sartre.’68
People perform their selves, and their selves are coterminous with their actions. This view
is by no means a typical one for a physician to hold, but its presence in a medical journal is
intriguing.
Identity is here radically malleable, in a context where people are presenting illness or
injury. This context, where identity is seen as non-essential and performed, resonates pro-
foundly with Munchausen syndrome. Rhodri Hayward’s study of psychological
approaches in twentieth-century British general practice ends with a similar disavowal of
65Jaques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans Gayatri C.
Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1997 [1967]).
66Media Education Foundation, ‘Race, the Floating
Signifier’ featuring Stuart Hall online at< https://
www.mediaed.org/assets/products/407/transcript_
407.pdf> accessed 24 July 2015.
67Anonymous, ‘Compensation for Cupidity’, The
Lancet, 1961, 277, 1099.
68Ibid., 1099.
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simplistic notions of truth. He argues that instead of ‘unrelenting scepticism’ towards
ideas of truth we might focus on how, in the ideas of twentieth-century psychiatrists ‘the
mere fact of belief is transformative . . . capable of creating new illnesses, new kinds of
patients and a new vision of society. It made its own truth.’69 This idea of the truth being
made and achieved forecloses the possibility of identity being stable and fixed. This posi-
tion is famously expressed by Sartre in Being and Nothingness, first published in English
in 1956. Sartre notes that a waiter at a Parisian cafe´ performs his role, almost exaggerat-
ing it, in order to be what he is:
the waiter in the cafe plays with his condition in order to realize it. This obligation is
not different from that which is imposed on all tradesmen. Their condition is wholly
one of ceremony. The public demands of them that they realize it as a ceremony;
there is the dance of the grocer, of the tailor, of the auctioneer, by which they
endeavour to persuade their clientele that they are nothing but a grocer, an auc-
tioneer, a tailor. . . . There are indeed many precautions to imprison a man in what
he is, as if we lived in perpetual fear that he might escape from it, that he might
break away and suddenly elude his condition.70
This is a paradox. The idea of performing one’s self in order that one does not elude one-
self is paradoxical because an essence cannot be an act, just as an act cannot be an
essence:
[I]f I represent myself as him, I am not he . . . I can only play at being him . . . if I am
one [a waiter], this can not be in the mode of being in-itself. I am a waiter in the
mode of being what I am not.71
This paradox is analogous to the one at the centre of Munchausen syndrome, where a
person is exposed as ill, precisely because they are pretending to be ill. More generally,
according to Sartre, a person can only achieve their identity by play, self-conscious acting.
During the mid-twentieth century, there is an increased awareness of acting, performing
and imitating that explicitly rejects the idea of a deep, fixed self beneath it (as in
Hacking’s disavowal of a singular human nature). The acting and deception becomes the
self—but all in a very specific context. If Munchausen syndrome, anthropology and exis-
tentialism are context-specific, so must ‘looping’ be.
And here we complete the loop back to Hacking, who uses Sartre’s waiter in ‘Making
up People’. He argues that
Thus the idea of making up people is enriched; it applies . . . to all of us. It is not just
the making up of people of a kind that did not exist before: not only are the split
[personality patient] and the waiter made up, but each of us is made up.72
69Hayward, Transformation of the Psyche, 131.
70Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans Hazel
E. Barnes (London: Meuthen & Co., 1957 [1943]), 59.
71Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 60.
72Hacking, ‘Making up People’, 168.
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‘Making up people’ fits within a web of twentieth-century ideas: medical discussions of
compensation, psychology in general practice, post-colonial race theory, cultural anthro-
pology, Derrida’s linguistics and Sartre’s existentialism. The concern of medicine with
identity shows up most clearly in Munchausen syndrome, where roles, acting and identity
collide. This is complicated by the fact that Munchausen syndrome becomes a psychiatric
pathology. The patient ‘plays’ at being ill, and therefore achieves a (different) patient-
hood; the waiter ‘plays’ at being a waiter, and becomes one by virtue of what he is not.
The diagnosis of Munchausen syndrome is a paradoxical attempt to fix the identity of
the patient. It is built upon the possibility that identities might be managed or controlled
by patients, but also attempts to shut this down and police it. Far from Sartre’s radical
freedom, most doctors diagnosing Munchausen syndrome seek to impose control, argu-
ing for blacklists, photographs and issuing warnings in correspondence to aid other doc-
tors in the swift exposure of such patients. Others seek to contain, treat and cure what
they see as a dangerously self-destructive psychological disorder. This is the polar opposite
of the Lancet article’s Sartrean acceptance. This refusal of flexibility attempts to confound
the malleability in ‘making up people’: patients diagnosed with Munchausen syndrome
are, by that act of diagnosis, denied the flexibility to assume the sick role. In fact, the at-
tempt is pathologised. Again, this shows that Munchausen syndrome’s historicity is identi-
cal to Hacking’s.
Stephen Greenblatt’s famous idea of Renaissance Self-Fashioning (1980) emerged
around the same time as Hacking’s ‘Making Up People’ (1983). However, according to
the logic of my argument, it would be a mistake to equate practices of Renaissance peo-
ple with the tangled twentieth-century threads of Sartre, Hacking and Munchausen
syndrome.
In any case, Greenblatt explicitly acknowledges his debt to precisely the anthropology
we have been discussing. He claims that his intention is to ‘practice a more cultural or an-
thropological criticism—if by “anthropological” here we think of interpretive studies of cul-
ture by [Clifford] Geertz, James Boon, Mary Douglas, Jean Duvignaud, Paul Rabinow,
Victor Turner and others’.73 A malleable identity is read into the past through a very spe-
cific corpus of twentieth-century anthropology. This is not to demean Greenblatt’s scholar-
ship, for he does acknowledge his own situatedness, accepting ‘the impossibility of . . .
leaving behind one’s own situation . . . the questions I ask of my material and indeed the
very nature of this material are shaped by the questions I ask of myself’.74 However he
does not link this up to his twentieth-century anthropological tools. He also slips into
rather totalising language at points. When discussing a particular passage of Spenser’s The
Faerie Queene (1590, 1596) he argues that ‘The experience I have just described is, insofar
as the work retains its power, common to us all, embedded in each of our histories per-
sonal histories, though a protective cultural amnesia may have led us to forget it until we
reexperience it in art.’75 Thus Greenblatt uses psychological and anthropological concepts
and approaches, created in the twentieth century, in order to understand texts from the
sixteenth century. Further, upon this reading, he explicitly argues for a human universal:
73Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning
From Moore to Shakespeare with a New Preface
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005 [1980]), 4.
74Ibid., 5.
75Ibid., 179.
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even if you don’t think you have experienced it, you are probably being protected by ‘cul-
tural amnesia’.
All this might sound rather sniping, petty and unfair. I want to stress that I am not
seeking to invalidate Greenblatt’s pioneering scholarship (and I am in no way pretending
any expertise in Early Modern literature). In any case, it is highly significant that during a
relatively short period—less than 15 years—between the late 1960s and early 1980s, all
these examples emerged. We have the concepts of abnormal illness behaviour (1969),
self-fashioning (1980) and making up people (1983) all drawing significantly upon an-
thropology and sociology. It is also during the 1980s that Hacking begins his shift from
the history of science to the history of subjectivity. There are many more examples out
there than cannot be presented in a short article. My point is to ask a more general ques-
tion: given the clear specificity of this ‘malleable humanity’ in twentieth-century anthro-
pology, which concepts are we happy to project back into the past, and at which ones
do we baulk? It remains the case that historians of medicine generally give much shorter
shrift to diagnoses of Hamlet as schizophrenic, than those who project anthropological
(rather than medical) concepts back in time, into places where they did not exist. This
point is taken up in conclusion.
Conclusion
Thirty years on from ‘making up people’ we must historicise these ideas, and sketch their
limits. Munchausen syndrome enables us to see how both ‘making up people’ and
‘Munchausen syndrome’ are based upon the same broad influential, historical idea: that
identities and roles are malleable and manageable; they are deeply affected by self-
consciousness; they are bounded and enabled by social context; they can be performed,
manipulated, aspired to and achieved. Thus: they can become disordered. Why should
concepts be ideal and ahistorical when we accept that diagnoses are not?
Although the work of Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari is often infuriatingly opaque,
there is something in their final collaboration What is Philosophy? that is useful when
considering these limits. When interrogating the nature of concepts (in our case either
concepts of Munchausen syndrome or of ‘making up people’ and ‘looping effects’) they
argue that ‘[a]ll concepts are connected to problems without which they would have no
meaning’. This emphasises the point that concepts are situated and ‘can only be assessed
as a function of their problems and their plane’.76 This sense of limit, of a boundary be-
yond which concepts ‘have no meaning’ is what I want to emphasise. This question
might also be approached through an appreciation of reflexivity, as formulated a decade
ago by Roger Smith:
It is always possible, in any reasoning or body of thought, to find presumptions
which that reasoning or body of thought cannot itself justify. There are always
unfounded presumptions . . . and we can ‘reflexively,’ make these assumptions the
focus of enquiry.77
76Giles Deleuze and Fe´lix Guattari, What is
Philosophy?, trans H. Tomlinson and G. Burchill
(London: Verso, 1994 [1991]), 16, 27.
77Roger Smith, ‘The History of Psychological Categories’,
Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and
Biomedical Sciences, 2005, 36, 55–94, 56.
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Reflexivity is very much a part of this move to examine identity, to stress situated knowl-
edge, and to bring out its implications for scholarship. Everybody is situated, everybody
has a (different) partial view, any pretence of omniscience becomes deeply unfashion-
able. We are all inside our own frames of reference. Hacking acknowledges this point in
The Taming of Chance (1990) when he observes that ‘styles of reasoning’ (although he is
not talking about his own) are ‘curiously self-confirming’.78 The presumptions of a cer-
tain body of thought form the foundation, and thus the limit, for both Munchausen syn-
drome and Hacking.
Debates over retrospective diagnosis in the history of medicine make even clearer the
temporal and geographical limits of various concepts. An influential approach within the
academic study of medical history considers it anachronistic to apply current diagnoses, or
‘concepts of disease’ to illnesses and conditions in the past. Such an application is known
as ‘retrospective diagnosis’. Katherine Foxhall explores whether or not the celebrated me-
dieval abbess Hildegard of Bingen could be said to suffer from migranes, and provides a
useful summary of the main points of debate.79 Did Rameses II die of tuberculosis? Was
the madness of King George III caused by porphyria? Did Nietzche have syphilis?80 One of
the classic statements against retrospective diagnosis is Caroline Walker Bynum’s Holy
Feast and Holy Fast (1987) which is sceptical of the utility of describing medieval women
as anorexic.81 Foxhall changes tack, and argues instead that ‘taking examples of retro-
spective diagnoses as historical artefacts in themselves’, can be very revealing. This move,
putting methodological approaches into historical context, shares much with the ap-
proach of the present article.
Adrian Wilson points out that when current concepts are applied across history, and
‘diseases are all taken to coincide with their respective modern concepts’ the effect ‘is to
construct a conceptual space in which the historicity of all disease-concepts, whether past
or present, has been obliterated’.82 Thus diseases are denied any meaningful history, as
they are deemed essentially unchanging and always equivalent to the current concept or
idea. Hacking is ambivalent about such ‘retroactive’ processes. He argues that ‘[a]s a cau-
tious philosopher, I am inclined to say that many retroactive redescriptions are neither def-
initely correct or definitely incorrect’.83 Whilst such an action might be politically useful,
even politically progressive in some senses, it falls some way short of being adequately his-
torical. Hacking hedges his bets on this point: ‘[a]s we recede into the past, culture and
78Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 6–8.
79Katherine Foxhall, ‘Making Modern Migraine
Medieval: Men of Science, Hildegard of Bingen and
the Life of a Retrospective Diagnosis’, Medical
History, 2014, 58, 354–74.
80Roger Cooter, ‘The Life of a Disease?’, The Lancet,
2010, 375, 111–12; Sander Gilman, ‘Review of
Richard Schain, The Legend of Nietzsche’s Syphilis’
Isis’, 2002, 93, 733–4; Bruno Latour, ‘On the Partial
Existence of Existing and Nonexisting Objects’, in
Lorraine Daston, ed., Biographies of Scientific
Objects (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2000), 247–69.
81Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast:
The Significance of Food to Medieval Women
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1987).
82Wilson, ‘On the History of Disease-concepts’, 273.
83Hacking, Rewriting the Soul, 243. Here Hacking is
talking about redescribing soliders shot for ‘coward-
ice’ in the First World War as suffering from post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Such a redescrip-
tion—if accepted by the authorities in the late twen-
tieth century—is intended to allow the families of
those shot to reclaim medals awarded to those
soldiers.
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norms become increasingly different, and I develop qualms about retroactive
application’.84
Lorraine Daston expands upon Hacking’s sense of history in a review of the second edi-
tion of his book The Emergence of Probability in 2006. She argues (admittedly talking
about his histories of science, not of subjectivity) that his work ‘is not hostile to context
. . . but neither is it about context’. Within this generous review she continues that
‘Hacking is a scrupulous reader, with a strong sense of the otherness of the past, but he
does not hesitate to translate seventeenth-century ideas into modern parlance’.85 And
where does Daston go for an illuminating comparison to drive home the point?
Twentieth-century anthropology:
Hacking’s attitude toward his historical actors is endearingly reminiscent of that
which Clifford Geertz ascribed to the great British anthropologist E. Evans-
Pritchard: however outlandish the beliefs of another people may seem . . . these
strangers ultimately navigate by the same matter-of-fact, rational principles as
one’s neighbors in Oxford or Cambridge.86
For Hacking, in the assessments of his most generous critics, the past is indeed a foreign
country. But it is a particular kind of foreign country, with a sense of difference and
sameness imported from a particular anthropological project; it is just as situated and em-
bedded as in any disease category. It is a vision of difference that is founded upon a plas-
tic sameness, an historically specific vision of human nature and of the past.
It is relatively uncontroversial to argue that retrospective diagnosis (as a specifically
medical or clinical genre of retroactive redescription) is not simply inadequate history. It
also naturalises the present, by projecting currently valid knowledge back through time.
If the categories, concepts and ideas that are dominant today can also be found through-
out history, then this puts them into a category close to universal, and forecloses any ef-
fort to contest or change them. Instead of accepting this damaging stasis, we should
follow Joan Scott’s call to give concepts a more situated history, ‘placing them in time
and subject to review’, opening the way to change.87
The point worth pursuing here is this: if disease concepts should not be projected back
into the past, they why should concepts that describe processes of identity formation
and change be valid in the past? It seems anachronistic to speak of Ancient Greeks, or
Renaissance Lords ‘making themselves up’ in ways that become visible and meaningful in
the twentieth century. This is not the same as saying that these past identities are irrevo-
cably fixed or permanent. It is simply to say that there are no grounds for arguing that
these identities are malleable or negotiable in the same ways as envisaged by twentieth-
century philosophy, anthropology, sociology and history of medicine. Ultimately, if we
84Hacking, Rewriting the Soul, 254.
85Lorraine Daston, ‘Review: The History of
Emergences’, Isis, 2007, 98,801–8, 807.
86Daston, ‘The History of Emergences’, 807.
87Joan Wallach Scott, ‘History-writing as Critique’, in K.
Jenkins, S. Morgan and A. Munslow, eds, Manifestos
for History (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 19–38, 34–5.
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baulk at universalising Munchausen syndrome (and I certainly do), we should be very cau-
tious indeed about presuming ‘making up people’ or ‘looping’ to be universal.
It is not fatal to the usefulness of these concepts that they spring from the same con-
text, and are sustained by the same insights as Munchausen syndrome. However, the ar-
gument in this article is built upon the fact that Munchausen syndrome is historically
specific, and is intelligible as part of an historically specific context. Therefore it cannot be
diagnosed throughout history or function in a universal manner. The reason Munchasuen
syndrome has been picked to interrogate Hacking is that not only is it specific, but its spe-
cificity is identical to that of ‘making up people’ and ‘looping effects’. The insights that
make Munchausen syndrome visible—that identity and social roles are malleable and ma-
nipulable, rather than fixed and essential—are precisely those that inform and buttress
Hacking. Making up people is the conventional side, Munchausen syndrome the patho-
logical side. If we see Munchausen syndrome like this, why should we expect Hacking’s
concepts to stand outside of this context?
This has wide implications for the history of medicine. It means that we must be more
aware of the specificity of our tools as well as the diagnoses we study. As a discipline, the
history of medicine is already aware of this in so many areas: few historians today would
use Freud’s tools of the death instinct, Oedipus complex or superego to understand the
motivations of Henry VIII. We see these tools as bounded, specific and irreducibly histori-
cal. So why not Hacking’s?
This injunction, restricting the validity of ‘making up people’ might be seen as con-
straining, or even destructive to the ability to write history. It might be argued that all lan-
guage is situated and historically specific, and that (for example) we can only use early
modern language to describe early modern history. I think that this is to overstate the
case. I am only arguing here that concepts of (self-)identity need to be restricted. This
seems a relatively insignificant change when viewed next to the challenges successfully
mounted in recent decades to the assumed universality of the human body or human
emotions.88 History has not been constrained by these challenges to universalism, on the
contrary, it has been enriched.
So whilst this proposed restriction of Hacking might be constraining in a specific and
narrow sense, it is liberating in another, opening up another order of questions: how is
identity imagined in early modern London? With which concepts did medieval hermits
parse or cultivate their sense of self, if at all? Is there a subtle violence in assuming all hu-
man identity to be sociologically/anthropologically plastic and malleable?
This article too is a product of a specific historical moment. Scholarship in general
seems to be careering towards ever-more neurological and epigenetic visions of human-
ity, with some sociologists cautiously optimistic about the possibility for collaboration
with epigeneticists.89 I must say that I am not optimistic that this particular playing field is
88Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive
Limits of Sex (London, Routledge, 1993); Thomas
Dixon, From Passions to Emotions: the Creation of a
Secular Psychological Category (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
89Des Fitzgerald, Nikolas Rose and Ilina Singh,
‘Revitalizing Sociology: Urban Life and Mental Illness
between History and the Present’, British Journal of
Sociology, 2016, 67, 138–60.
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level, or that collaboration would be mutually enriching (and these are doubts with a sig-
nificant history).90 However, in this context, the specificity of twentieth-century anthro-
pology, and its assumption of the universal plasticity of identity, comes more into focus
as a point of contrast.
Returning briefly to Derek Freeman’s assessment of Mead and Boas (published in
2000), we can see clear evidence of this. He calls this ‘culturalism’, this idea of malleabil-
ity in human nature, ‘one of the ruling myths of the twentieth century’. Given the mur-
derous impact of biological thinking and eugenic racism during that 100-year span, one
might contest this rather partial characterisation that the twentieth century was ‘ruled’
by a diminishment of the role of biology in human life. In any case, Freeman is now con-
vinced that ‘culturalism’ is buried, because ‘never before have there been such funda-
mental advances in our understanding of human life’. Predictably, he name-checks the
prestigious trio of genetics, cellular biology and neuroscience. Further, he drives home
this advantage by reporting the announcement in June 2000 of ‘the virtual completion
of the Genome Project’ which allegedly leaves culturalism exposed as ‘one of the most
egregious anthropological errors of all time’.91 It couldn’t be clearer here that the turn
back to biology in the twenty-first century, powered by the rhetorical clout and limitless
ambition of the new genetics, genomics and neurosciences, has rendered the culturally-
embedded human nature of twentieth-century anthropology more visible. Never mind
that the Human Genome project has produced what two scholars have called ‘a list of
parts with no instruction book on how to put them together’. In fact the ‘holy grail’ of
gene sequencing has thrown up many more questions than answers and few tangible
health benefits, let alone insights into the kinds of behaviours studied by anthropologists.
When it turned out that humans possessed as many genes as a fruit fly, and shared half
their genes with a banana, ‘[t]he molecular biologists who had confidently predicted that
all human life could be read off from the linear string of DNA went rather quiet’.92 The
debate between nature and nurture is not settled—and it is unlikely ever to be—but as
the influence of different methodologies wax and wane, the outlines of past systems of
thought become less self-evident and more visible.
All concepts have a place in history, but this historical nature becomes visible or obvi-
ous in different ways at different times. We should take note of concepts’ place in his-
tory, and thus their limits. They might enlighten, they might collapse the past into the
present, they might be irrelevant in certain contexts. However, the key to history is
awareness that one is telling a story, building a narrative and using a specific conceptual
armoury to do so. These narratives and tools have limits. They assume and accentuate, di-
minish and dismiss various parts of the past as they identify and interrogate source
material.
Every history is a history of the present, and thus uses only the tools available at certain
points in time. Explicit awareness of, and reflection upon the boundedness of our tools
can enrich history with new questions, and caution historians against overreach. In this
90David Armstrong, ‘Tensions in Biopsychosocial
Medicine’, Social Science and Medicine, 1987, 25,
1213–18.
91Freeman, ‘Mead’s Coming of Age’, 102.
92Hilary Rose and Steven Rose, Genes Cells and Brains:
The Promethean Promises of the New Biology
(London: Verso, 2012), 278–84.
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specific case, we must work through the boundedness and historical specificity of the
‘malleable humanity’, the idea of anthropological, plastic, inscribable human nature. It
makes Munchausen syndrome comprehensible as a disordered desire for the ‘sick role’,
and underwrites Hacking’s notion of ‘making up people’. A history of this paradoxical
‘anti-universalizing universal’ does not mean that we must join in the swing back to biol-
ogy. However, we must not give this comfortingly progressive idea of universal plasticity
a ‘free pass’ when it comes to historical reflection, lest we commit unwarranted violence
on the identity politics of the past as well as the present.
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